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INFORMATION GAMES IN THE QUEST FOR MINDSHARE 
Abstract: The rapid growth and great popularity of Internet sites that specialize in providing 
intangible services in the form of information and community services gives rise to new forms of 
competition. Information Web sites such as www.how2.com and community sites such as 
www.iVillage.com provide free "content" and rely on advertising and hosting revenues to 
generate income. The competition between content sites in the same market niche is intense and 
only a few companies are likely to survive. In this paper, we examine a 
number of competitive models or "information games" that provide insights into the nature of this 
competition. The models capture differences between the type and maturity of the markets and 
differences in the behavioral assumptions about the nature of consumer demand for content. 
While these markets often have a "winner-takes-all" nature, we find a number of situations in 
which more than one player can survive at equilibrium. 
Keywords: Electronic markets; information goods; competitive equilibria 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Advances in information technology, and in particular, the rise of the World Wide Web (WWW) 
accentuate the differences between information goods and other goods (Varian & Shapiro 1998, 
p.3). While information goods are often costly to produce, they have (almost) zero costs of 
reproduction. Only a few years ago, Encyclopaedia Britannica, was sold at retail for $1,600 per 
31-volume hard-copy set. The same information on a CD can be reproduced for almost $1 per 
copy. Faced with competition from Microsoft's Encarta and other CD-based encyclopaedias, 
Britannica entered the CD-based market and was forced to continually reduce its price until it 
matched Microsoft Encarta's price of $89.95 per CD. The online version of Britannica suffered 
even more price attrition. At first, annual subscriptions to the Web-based version of Britannica 
cost $120 per year but attracted very few customers. In September 1999, Britannica decided to 
make its content free on the Internet. One day after the announcement, users swamped 
Britannica's Web site, (Headlam 1999). On the Web, price elasticity, for at least some 
information goods, is high only in the vicinity of zero! 
In fact, it is often hard for a Web site to charge subscription fees or to price its content on a per 
use basis (Reuters 1999). Notable exceptions are AOL and other well-established online 
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information and community sites that have always charged a subscription and have built a huge 
base of users. The Wall Street Journal successfully introduced a subscription fee on its Web site 
in 1998. However, the New York Times still distributes its content free online along with a 
majority of other sites on the Web. To survive, companies that are solely Web-based - content 
Web sites such as Yahoo and community Web sites such as GeoCities.com and IVillage.com - 
rely on advertising and online commerce revenue. Advertising revenues depend on attracting a 
very large number of users. For example, a major advertising network such as Flycast will not 
accept Web sites that have fewer than 100,000 page views per month (www.flycast.com). The 
same is true, although possibly to a lesser extent, with e-commerce revenues. Portal sites, like 
Yahoo, that are the first entry point to the Web for millions of users, have the scale to attract 
significant advertising and e-commerce revenue. Information Systems Providers (ISPs), who 
provide local access to the Web, are attempting to become portals by providing search 
capabilities and content such as access to news items. In turn, portals are busy trying to turn 
themselves into "hubs" like AOL, where users stay for extended periods of time to communicate 
with other users, enjoy rich content, click on banner advertisements, and shop. 
While our analysis in this paper applies to some extent to portals and hubs, their operations are 
becoming increasingly complex as e-commerce and physical distribution of goods becomes 
relatively more important. Our research is more applicable to "information" sites and 
"community" sites. Both depend for their success on capturing the attention and loyalty of a 
specific community of users. In the former, the community is united through a common interest 
in the content offered by the site. In the latter, the community is based on the attraction of 
interacting with people of similar interests, occupations, hobbies, or ethnic background. 
Information sites and community sites both compete in "niche" markets and aim to be one of the 
top players in their niches. Motley Fool, which provides financial advice (an information site), 
has just completed a $25 million round of financing with the intent of increasing activity on its 
Web site (Anders 1999). Community Connect Inc., which runs AsianAvenue.com, the largest 
ethnic community site, recently launched another ethnic community site - BlackPlanet.com. The 
market for digital content is predicted to reach $275 billion by 2003 (Robinson 1999.) 
Community sites are currently one of the fastest growing areas of the Web (Sun 1999.) 
For the most part, we drop the distinction between "information" and "community" sites. For our 
purposes, they both provide "content" - either information in the conventional sense or 
information based on community interactions. The sites that we can include in our analysis obtain 
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revenues from advertising andlor by hosting "third party" commerce sites. By "third party 
commerce" we mean that physical distribution of products is not part of the service offered by the 
Web site. Thus, in addition to the pure information and community sites defined above, our 
analysis is applicable to sites that host online shopping malls and to auction sites such as 
Onsale.com, that rely on the buyers and sellers to perform the exchange of goods. Our analysis 
does not extend to Web sites such as LandsEnd.com and Amazon.com that involve physical 
distribution systems. Analysis of such sites requires more complex cost functions and different 
forms of analysis involving variables such as service quality, order-to-ship times, and so on. 
We define "mindshare" as a composite variable that captures a number of desirable relationships 
between a Web site and its users. These include the number of individuals that identify with the 
Web site as their primary source of content and the strength of their identification with the site. 
Capturing the mindshare of a community implies capturing the lion's share of visitors to the Web 
site. Within a given population mindshare is a fixed commodity. This means that Web sites that 
focus on a community are playing a market game of trying to grab share from the other players. 
Typically, a few Web sites have a dominant position within a community. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A small but growing literature examines industrial organization in the world of electronic 
commerce. An early hypothesis was that the decrease in transaction costs enabled by information 
technology (IT) would lead to a larger number of small, highly networked "virtual" organizations 
Malone & Laubacher (1998). On the other hand, as pointed out by Kambil et a1 (1999a,b) among 
others, IT also decreases the agency and other internal costs of hierarchical operations, increasing 
economies of scale and enabling much larger firms to operate efficiently. More germane to the 
current discussion, Internet sites often have positive network externalities (positive returns) 
associated with user participation. In essence, the value to a consumer of belonging to a network 
(using a Web site) often grows with the number of other consumers that use the site. Chat-rooms 
provide a good example where the value of a Web site grows with the number of users. A chat 
room with only one or two users is a pretty forlorn place! As pointed out by Arthur (1996) many 
of the assumptions of classical economics do not hold when network effects lead to increasing 
returns to scale. In particular, nothing prevents a firm from growing without bound and eventually 
dominating its market. 
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An analysis by Dewan et a1 (1998) addresses issues similar to those in this paper. They analyzed a 
game that included ISPs and content providers. Their analysis led to the conclusion that "content 
is king." In the long run, the content providers, rather than the access providers, have the 
advantage. To some extent, their analysis adds support for our concentration in this paper on 
content as a key competitive element. 
Much of the literature in electronic commerce has focused on issues of pricing in electronic 
markets. For example, Bakos and Brynjollfsson (1999) find that it is often preferable to "bundle" 
information goods together for sale rather than to price each item individually at a very low price 
as envisaged by proponents of micro payment systems. Aron (1999) investigates the impact of 
information search engine characteristics such as "recall" and "precision" on prices and product 
information. Among other things, he shows that it might often be optimal for Web merchants to 
trade-off accuracy in providing price information in favor of greater accuracy in portraying 
product characteristics. 
In contrast to this stream of literature that focuses on pricing issues, we investigate the very 
common situation (on the Web) where information goods are provided free of any explicit price. 
The cost to the users comes in the form of their expenditure of time and tolerance for advertising 
banners. 
3. MODEL FOUNDATIONS 
In this paper, we study the economics of competing for mindshare among a small number of Web 
sites. We focus on the competitive dimension of content in attracting visitors and members. 
This means that we ignore the influence of marketing and Web site design as a means for 
consumers to differentiate among sites. Our approach is to look at each community as a market 
with dominant providers who compete to maximize profits by providing content that attracts 
mindshare. We model the providers as oligopolistic players in a Cournot duopoly game. 
Classical oligopoly theory with standard supply and demand curves includes results on how one 
player reacts to changes in supply from another and whether or not one player can completely 
dominate a market. We examine these issues here under the different market structure of the 
Internet. The market for rnindshare is different from the market for a standard commodity. In a 
traditional market the consumer pays for the product and considers price an important component 
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when making a purchasing decision. In a game for mindshare the consumer does not necessarily 
pay for the product. Instead, advertisers and sales of ancillary products or services through an 
attached cyber mall pay for the free portion of the Web site. In this context, price is not a 
significant element in the competition for mindshare. 
We therefore assume a market in which Web sites offer their content for free but gain revenues 
from advertising andlor renting space to third parties in a shopping mall. Attractive content is 
required to gain and maintain visitors to the Web site and thereby generate advertising and e- 
commerce revenues. The Web sites can develop new, unique content, acquire exclusive rights to 
material developed by other organizations, duplicate material from other Web sites without 
copying it, or acquire nonexclusive rights to other material. 
We define a measure of the content in a Web site i, x,. This content can be a function of the 
number of messages posted to a bulletin board or chat room on a subject, the depth and breadth of 
information on diseases and conditions covered on a medical Web site, or the number of articles 
on a company posted to a finance Web site. We assume that the desirability of a site is an 
increasing function of the amount of content that it contains. 
Let the amortized cost of acquiring and maintaining content be Ci ( x i )  per time period. The cost 
functions can have a variety of shapes. If the content is provided in part by the members, then the 
cost of providing an additional unit of content decreases as content increases, since more content 
attracts more members and therefore more content. We see this phenomenon of positive returns 
to scale on community sites such as AsiaAvenue.com and BlackPlanet.com (Sun 1999.) In other 
cases, content costs may increase as the content space is exhausted and it becomes harder and 
harder to add something new. This is likely to be the case with lifestyle sites where the 
permutations of human behavior are limited by our physical characteristics. This could become 
the case with pornography sites, as they have to appeal to more-and-more extreme tastes. Finally, 
costs can be proportional to content. An example may be news sites since the material regenerates 
continuously and the audience does not have to be subdivided further and further when adding 
new material. 
We keepx, an abstract concept. It can be measured in bits, for example. Alternatively, the units 
can be utiles captured by a utility function U ( y )  . These two measures translate from one to the 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-99-016 
A 
other using Ci (xi) = Ci (U-' (xi)) where U-' (xi) is the inverse of the utility function. For 
news sites, x, can be considered to be a measure of the quantity of the flow of information in the 
relevant domain rather than a stock. 
We examine four distinct cases of information Web site competition along two dimensions. The 
first dimension is whether or not the domain of information relevant to a community is exhausted 
and the second is whether or not the Web sites have exclusive rights to the information. Some 
examples may clarify this classification scheme. Dun & Bradstreet's credit vaIuations are both 
exclusive and exhaustive. Game sites have exclusive (proprietary) information, but there are other 
sites with rival games. Humor sites may have jokes in common and certainly have not exhausted 
the available jokes. Although the Patent Office is the original source of patent information, since 
information produced by the Federal government is copyright free, it does not have exclusive 
ownership of the information. In fact, IBM has built a patent Web site. A similar situation 
pertains to the Security and Exchange Commission's EDGAR database of company financial 
filings. Finally, Yahoo pays for nonexclusive rights to Reuters' news articles, which do not 
exhaust all possible news items. Table 1 summarizes these examples and also identifies the 
models that we develop during the course of the paper. 
Table 1: Classification of Competitive Situations 
I Reuters on Yahoo I U.S. Patent Office 
Ownership 
Not Exclusive 
4. MODEL 1: EXCLUSIVE, NON-EXHAUSTIVE CONTENT 
Information Domain 
Exclusive 
The market for free Web sites is comparable to the market for television services in that the 
programming is provided at no cost and the revenues come from advertisers. However, the 
differences in technologies lead to major differences in market structure. The most critical 




Models 2 and 3 
Humor sites 
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Exhaustive 
Model 1' 
Dun & Bradstreet 
Models 2' and 3' 
EDGAR Database 
the same time slots. Also, given the limited number of channels and their high fixed cost, 
television communities are so broadly defined that it is impossible to monopolize their time. On 
the Internet, content is available on demand. Consequently, the attractiveness of a Web site's 
content is the key element in establishing its competitive position. 
Hits to a Web site depend on the amount of content in the Web site and the amount of content in 
competing Web sites. Since people have more than one interest, we also need to factor in the 
effects of other Web sites and media in drawing people away from the community. Since viewers 
have a fixed amount of recreation time, we look at the proportion of this time that can be captured 
by a Web site. We posit a behavior of viewers where the share of recreation time spent at the site 
is positively related to the site's share of content. We use the following functional form for 
shares among Web sites competing for a community's interest. 
Here, x, is the amount of content in site, i. Alternatively, x, can be interpreted as the aggregate 
utility of the content on the Web site. The exponent a is a shape parameter that captures 
alternative community responses to the quantity and share of information. With a I 1, (I)  is a 
concave function that is asymptotic to 1. With a>l,  (1) becomes s-shaped and asymptotic to 1. 
This functional form has had a long history in modeling economic phenomena. Mills (1961) used 
it to model market share as a function of promotional effort. Luce (1959) used it to model market 
share as a function of utility. McFadden (1974) extended this model by using exponentials 
instead of powers for the individual terms in (1) and showed that this form can be derived from 
probability distributions of utility. For a survey of these models see Meyer and Kahn (1991) and 
Cooper and Nakanishi (1988). This share model has a variety of uses. For example, Boyd, 
Phillips and Regulinski (1982) used (1) in models of technology choice. 
As the content grows in the Web sites serving a cotnrnunity, members will devote more of their 
time to this community at the expense of other communities. Yet, members will still participate 
in other communities. To analyze a market, we partition the sites into those that react to each 
other and those that do not view themselves as part of the community and do not react to changes 
in activity by the Web sites within the community. We can aggregate the other attractors of 
mindshare that are outside our community of interest into a constant. Let b be the total content of 
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Web sites outside the community that is of interest to members within the community. For 
example, members of a flower-gardening community also can track stocks in their 401 K's 
through Yahoo Finance, which does not react to changes in gardening websites. The content of 
Yahoo Finance is incorporated in 6. The share formula (1) becomes 
We assume that the number of visitors to the site is a function of its market share as given by (2). 
For sites establishing a new community of interest, b is relatively large and s, will be small or 
even tiny. We assume a fixed total amount of mindshare, M, that is possessed by all the potential 
users of the content or community sites that we are analyzing. Let M, be measured in minutes per 
month, for example. M is the amount of these users' time that they are prepareaable to spend on 
the Internet. While M is growing quite rapidly as more and more people spend more and more 
time on the Internet, we assume that this growth is independent of the content offered by sites in 
the market we are studying. Then s, x M is the total number of minutes spent on site i in a 
month. 
We assume that the revenues received by the site are proportional to the number of minutes spent 
by visitors to the site in any time period. This is approximately true for ad revenues that are based 
on contractual rates per impression or clickthrough. It will also be approximately true for "third 
party" electronic commerce revenues if we can assume that the average new visitor spends 
approximately the same amount per time period as existing users. Our revenue model is then 
where, v,, represents the average value per minute of a visitor to the site, and x is a vector of all x,. 
We assume each firm optimizes given its cost and revenue stream. We have the following 
optimization model for firm i 
xlfl 
max P,(x)=d, x - Ci(xi). 
,TI 20 z x f  + b  
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where, to simplify the notation, we defined d,  = vi x M. Here, d, is the marginal revenue given 
that the total mindshare equals M. 
The standard approach for representing competition in an oligopoly is to assume that each player 
maximizes its revenue function taking the other players' investments as given. We take this 
approach here as well. The content levels where neither player can improve, given the other 
players' positions is the Nash-Cournot equilibrium. Mills (1961) used this approach and it has 
become standard in the marketing literature. See, for example, Urban and Hauser (1993). 
The nature of the solution depends on the assumptions about the parameters. For example, when 
a l l  and C, (x ,  ) is convex, then P,(x) is concave and has a unique optimum and a local optimum 
is global. When a>l and/or C, ( x ,  ) is strictly concave, P,(x) is not necessarily concave and (4)  
can have local optima that are not global. That the optimum to (4)  is unique does not mean that 
the solution of the game is unique. We examine the character of the game under different cost 
structures. 
When Game 1 is Convex 
In this section of the paper we examine the simplest form of the game - a duopoly where each 
player has the following concave optimization problem 
We find the solution to (5)  for player i, given the content level x, for the other players, by taking 
the derivative of (5), setting it equal to 0, and solving for x, 
Equation (6)  describes how x, changes as a function of x,. This is known as the reaction function. 
The derivative of (6) gives the slope of the reaction function, which is 
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Note that for x, = 0 ,  when b andlor Ci are small or the marginal revenue, d, is large, (7) is 
positive. That is, we can say 
Theorem 1: When the competitor's site content is low and only a small portion of consumers' 
mindshare is outside the community, each player reacts to increases in content of the other player 
by increasing its content. 
This result is the opposite of what happens in traditional market games. In the standard oligopoly 
game with a demand curve that decreases with increasing prices, when player j increases its 
production, player i reduces its production. This result for the mindshare game is a partial 
explanation of the aggressive moves that competing firms engage in to establish their initial 
positions within a community. 
Note that as x, increases, (7) is monotonically decreasing to -1 in the limit. This means that the 
reaction functions are concave, and if even if they increase, they eventually decrease. The 
reaction functions and the equilibrium are illustrated in Figure 1. The structure of the reaction 
functions implies that they intersect once and only once and we can say the following. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Theorem 2: With the cost structure defined in (5) ,  a solution to the game exists and is unique. 
d i Proof: From (6), for player i to enter the game, we must have - > b . With both players 
C i  
in the game, by (7), the reaction functions are continuous, and after any increase, they decrease to 
0. Consequently, the reaction functions intersect once and only once. 
The key feature that leads to these results is the concavity of P, Whenever a 5 1  and C, (x, ) is 
convex, these results will hold. 
When the Player Optimization Problems in Game 1 are Non-convex 
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For a>l the revenue function is monotonically increasing. However, it has an s shape and is not 
concave. When the cost function is concave, ( 4 )  is not unimodular and can have multiple local 
optima. Consequently, solving the individual-player optimizations becomes complex and the 
Cournot equilibrium may not exist. This issue has been raised in the context of the multinomial 
logit model of McFadden (1980). Gruca and Sudharshan (1991,1992) show that that model 
implies the optimal solution is to spend the maximum possible amount on advertising by any firm 
with less than a 50% market share. To provide a more reasonable solution, Mesak and Means 
(1998) introduce decreasing returns to advertising. Hanson and Martin (1996) address the 
computational issues in solving the non-convex model and conclude that each setting of model 
parameters requires individual treatment. We take this approach in the context of information 
games. 
In our context, the cost function can be either convex or concave. As discussed above, it is 
concave for communities where the participants create the content and the existing content leads 
the members to generate new content. When the optimization problem for a player is nonconvex, 
the solution is harder to find since a local optimum is not necessarily global. With two players, 
the problem remains tractable because the combinatorial possibilities that must be considered 
remain small. 
The general reaction function is the solution to the following equation 
Since this equation does not solve readily in general, we illustrate some of the consequences of 
having a non-convex game with a profit function that is not unimodular by means of an example. 
The numbers provided here can be reproduced using Solver in Excel. 
Figure 2 shows the objective function for player 1 when x2 =0,4,6.1 and 7 and a=2. The other 
parameters are b=.5 and d=4 and the cost function is C, (x, ) = . The cost function is 
concave. From Figure 2, we see that the profit function is not unimodular. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
As shown below, the game with both players having these parameters does not have an 
equilibrium under the standard Cournot assumptions. This is all the more striking since the game 
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is symmetric and each player has the same cost structure and demand response. Using Figure 3 
we can understand why. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
The profit line is the profit each player would have if both invested in the same amount of 
content. The derivative of the profit function of player 1 (also, player 2) given the level of player 
2 (also, player 1) shows in what direction player 1 should move given that both players start out 
at the same level on the horizontal axis. Note that whenever the profit line is positive (when both 
players have identical quantities of content), it is always profitable for player 1 to increase its 
content, and vice versa. By the same token, whenever player 2 can make a profit by matching 
player 1, it can do better by exceeding the content of player 1. That is, the model does not have 
an equal-share equilibrium with these parameters. 
Looking at the game as a tatonnement process in search of the Cournot equilibrium, this last 
property implies an escalation in content until one player drops out. The situation becomes more 
complicated in that once one of the players drops out, the profit-maximizing player that survives 
cuts its content to increase its profits. Say player 2 drops out and offers no content. Solving 
player 1's optimization problem with player 2 at 0, we see from Figure 2, that the optimal 
solution for player 1 is 2.1 with a profit of 2.58. This leads player 2 to reenter at a level beyond 
2.1. The increases continue until one player cannot make a profit and reduces its content to 0, at 
which point the other player drops its content to 2.1 and the cycle begins again. 
The only equilibrium that can occur is if the first player to move sets the content at a level where 
it is profitable and the other player can never make a profit. The first player solves the original 
optimization problem with the added constraint that the other player cannot make a profit. With 
the parameters used here, the level is 6.1 (see Figure 3 and reverse the roles of the players). If 
player 1 sets its content level to 6.1, player 2 does not enter the game and player 1 makes a profit 
of 1.82. To keep the other player out, the first player sacrifices .76 in immediate profit. 
The optimization by player 1 is equivalent to limit pricing in Cournot games. With limit pricing, 
player 1 sets its price at a level that denies player 2 the opportunity to make a profit. This 
strategy works only when player 2 has higher costs or, more importantly, economies of scale in 
production or customer relationships are present. Given a value of a>l ,  economies of scale exist, 
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and this limit-quantity strategy to keep out other entrants is likely to be the best one to undertake 
by a site pioneering in a community. 
Discussion of Model 1 
When competing Web sites have exclusive rights to information, we have shown that a unique 
equilibrium exists in the simplest case when the profit function is concave. In other cases, the 
equilibrium may not exist. However, when no standard equilibrium exists, a company can make 
a preemptive investment in content and block other entrants. 
We have analyzed the effects on the solution of different values for a. The effect of different 
levels of b is more straightforward. The larger the value of b, the shallower the revenue function. 
That is, the marginal revenue function is lower. When a>l,  as b increases, it takes a smaller 
value of x, to reach the point where the revenue function turns concave. Lastly, because the 
marginal revenue is lower with a larger b, the total content provided in the market of interest to 
the community is lower at the equilibrium. 
5. MODELS 2 AND 3: NON-EXHAUSTIVE, NON-EXCLUSIVE INFORMATION 
McFadden (1980) points out that the model in (1) suffers from the problem that the market shares 
are affected by irrelevant alternatives. He uses the example of consumer choice among 
transportation modes. Say one uses a share model such as equation (2) for an individual's choice 
of transportation to another city by car, train or bus, and then adds a blue bus to the red bus that 
already operates on this line. Then the market share of buses increases despite the blue bus not 
being a truly new alternative. The probability that the traveler will take a bus (either red or blue) 
should not increase as would be implied by the use of the share formula. 
The analog to this situation in information markets occurs when sites cany duplicate information. 
However, an information market has a different structure. If all companies have the same 
information, given all else equal (e.g., identical access times), a new entrant takes away market 
share from the others, even if the content is not different. In model 1, we assumed that each Web 
site had unique information. We now examine the issues associated with content overlap among 
the websites. 
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We present two different models of market share that depend on the consumer response to the 
overlapping content. Content overlap occurs when the information is identical, such as when two 
sites carry articles from Reuters, or when the information is very close, such as articles on the 
same subject appearing in Encyclopaedia Britannica and in Encarta. We assume that consumers 
are indifferent between the sites on issues other than their information content. To keep the 
discussion clear, we examine these models in the context of a duopoly and we leave out the 
coefficient, 6, representing the non-competing marketing and set the exponent, a=l. If consumers 
are equally likely to access either Web site when looking for specific content that is duplicated, 
the market-share equation is as follows. 
where x,, = the quantity of unique content in Web site i 
x, = the quantity of shared content in both Web sites. 
We refer to this as model 2. 
When the consumers go to Web sites based on their share of unique information, the share 
equation is as follows 
We refer to this as model 3. 
These models represent two polar-opposite responses by consumers. Model 2 is most appropriate 
when each time consumers go to the Web sites for single items of information, the site that they 
visit is independent of the site they last visited. 
Model 3 is the information-equivalent of choosing between two cars that are effectively identical, 
except that one has a cup holder and the other does not. In this case, the cup holder is the 
tiebreaker and the car without the cup holder does not sell despite millions invested in all of the 
other aspects of the car. In the information case, this is equivalent to the consumer seeking out 
the site containing the unique information desired and then using that site for the common 
information desired in the current round of searches. That is, model 3 captures the situation 
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where consumers combine their information-acquisition needs into extended searches or look for 
common information in the site last visited. 
In the following theorem we provide formal proofs that the behavioral assumptions for models 2 
and 3 lead to equations (9) and (lo), respectively. 
Theorem 3: (a) Model 2, equation (9), represents the market shares of each site if consumers are 
indifferent among the information sources for common information and their choice of site is 
independent of the most recently visited site. (b) If the first location examined for the current 
piece of information is the most recently used Web site then model 3, equation (lo), obtains. 
Proof: 
As stated above, we assume that consumers are indifferent between the sites on issues other than 
their information content. We also assume that access to each piece of content is equally likely 
and that the probability of a consumer accessing any piece of content is independent of the piece 
of content previously accessed. 
(a) In model 2, consumers are equally likely to access either Web site when looking for content 
that is duplicated. Clearly, for the unique information, access to each site is proportional to its 
share of unique information. Given the indifference assumption and no retention effects by a site, 
the site chosen by a consumer for common information is random and equally likely. This 
implies a 50% share of visits for common content as in equation (9). 
(b) In Model 3, we assume that users stay with the information provider that they last used as 
long as the next item that they desire is available on that provider's site. They change sites only 
when the next item is unique to the other site. The probability of staying in Web site i given the 
consumer is already in i is its fraction of all content that is available to the community including 
shared information. The probability of transitioning to j from i is the fraction of unique content in 
Web site j. The following Markov matrix represents the movements between Web sites. 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-99-016 
In this case, the market shares of the sites are the steady-state probabilities (76, ,n,) ,  which can 
be found by solving the two simultaneous equations 
which leads to 
xi - xs 
27, = 
x, + x,  - 2x,  
and the result holds. 
The above Markov model generalizes readily to calculate market shares for markets with more 
than two players. 
Analysis of Model 2 
The different models have very different implications for the nature of the market equilibrium. 
We begin by analyzing the optimization problem of player i using model 2 and general 
acquisition costs as a function of total content. 
Taking the derivatives with respect to x,, and x ,  , we can compare the value of acquiring content 
that the other player has versus continuing to acquire new content. The derivative with respect to 
x,, is 
xj,, + - x  ap. , xs 1 
= di x " C l ( x i ,  + x,  ) . 
axiu (xiu + xzu + xs 
The derivative with respect to x,  is 
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The first term in (15) is greater than the corresponding term in (16). Hence, as long as new 
content can be acquired, the better margin is to acquire new content instead of duplicating the 
content of others. Note that this inequality always holds. We now have the following theorem. 
Theorem 4: Neither Web site will duplicate the content of the other as long as new material can 
be added up to the point where the marginal profit of doing so is zero. 
If there is no initial shared information, the implication of this theorem is that case 2 reduces to 
case 1. 
Analysis of Model 3 
We now treat model 3. The optimization problem for player i is as follows. 
X i  - X, 
max < . ( x i , x , )  = d ,  x 
x, ,x, t o  - C ,  (xi + x,  ) x, + x ,  - 2x,  
subject to 
xs 5 x ,  . 
At the optimal solution, the derivatives with respect to x, and x, are as follows 
a<(xiJ .s )  = d, X ;  - x , ~  
- C;(x i  + x , )  5 0 ,  
axi ( x ,  + x2 - 2 ~ ,  ) 
and 
ac. (xi , X s  ) = di x X i  - x i  
2 - ~ ' ( x ,  + x , )  I 0  
ax,  ( x ,  + x, - 2x ,  1 
Note that when x, is positive, (18) is an equality and when x, is positive, (19) is an equality. 
We see from (19) that the smaller player never tries to duplicate content since the derivative (19) 
in this case is negative. Note that when xi>x,, the marginal revenue term in (19) is positive and 
increasing in x,. Thus the revenue term is convex with respect to x,. The nature of the equilibrium 
then depends on the shape of C i  ( x i  + x ,  ) . If C ,  (x i  + x, ) is concave, the profit function is 
convex with respect to x ,  and the optimal solution lies at one of the two extremes, x,=O or x,=x,. If 
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Ci (xi + x, ) is convex, the profit function need not be either convex or concave. In this case, we 
can say only that a solution satisfies the fundamental condition that marginal cost equals marginal 
revenue for interior solutions and that marginal cost can be below marginal revenue when the 
solution is on the boundary. We summarize this in the following theorem. 
Theorem 5: In model 3, when C, (x, + x, ) is concave, there are two potential equilibria for the 
larger player. Either it does not duplicate anything or it duplicates all of the content of the 
smaller player. The smaller player never adds duplicate content. When C, (x, + x,  ) is convex, 
the larger player duplicates content until marginal revenue equals marginal cost or until the 
smaller player is eliminated. In all cases, since the smaller player never duplicates information, x, 
= 0 at equilibrium. 
The last sentence in the theorem follows since model 3 assumes that only unique content is 
valuable in attracting customers. The smaller player therefore surrenders any content duplicated 
by the larger player. 
In the concave cost case, we can give a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for the larger 
player to duplicate the content of the smaller player. Initially, let x, = 0 and find the equilibrium 
for xl and x2 in problem (17). Setting the partial derivative (18) equal to zero and using this 
equation to eliminate the cost term in (19), we find that 
If x, > 2x, , then (20) is positive and x, should be increased. Concavity ensures that increasing 
x, lowers marginal cost in (18) and (19) and the result holds. 
Corollary: If (20) is true for x, = 0, the larger player, i, should acquire all of the content owned 
by the smaller player, j. 
The situation is more complex than stated above because the smaller player must recognize the 
potential for the larger player to duplicate its content. Consequently, the smaller player faces an 
optimization problem that is more complex than (17) in that it must choose a minimum content 
level so that it is not optimal for the larger player to duplicate its content. That is, player j must 
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first iteratively solve player i's optimization problem for x, with x, fixed until it finds the 
minimum level of x, for which x, = 0. Then it must solve its optimization problem with this as a 
lower bound. If the profit at this lower bound is negative, then player j does not enter or it exits 
the market. In a sense, the decision to duplicate or not has all of the features of a two-stage game 
with a closed-loop equilibrium. 
Discussion of Models 2 and 3 
We have analyzed two different duopoly games for the case where Web sites may have unique, as 
well as duplicate, content and it is possible to add new content. In Model 2 consumers make 
independent choices of which site they will use when they need an item of content offered by 
both sites. In this case, up to a certain point, neither Web site duplicates the content in the other 
Web site. 
In Model 3, each consumer is attracted to the site that has (for him or her) the most unique 
information. The result for Model 3 states that, with concave costs there are two potential choices 
for an equilibrium. In the first case, the larger Web site duplicates all the content in the smaller 
Web site, forcing it out of business. In the second case, the larger Web site duplicates no content 
and the smaller site stays in business. The solution, once found, is unique. When costs are 
convex, the increasing cost of duplication can lead the larger player to not completely duplicate 
the content of the smaller player. Consequently, the smaller player can survive despite the size of 
the larger player. 
The larger player has a limit-pricing game, similar to the one described in the context of Model 1. 
Say player i eliminates player j. The larger player's profit in (17) is maximized by having minimal 
content. However, to maintain its market dominance, it must acquire sufficient content to block 
the re-entry of player j. That is, the larger player may have to make a strategic investment, where 
price is below marginal cost. 
6. WHEN COMPETING WEB SITES EXHAUST ALL RELEVANT CONTENT 
In this section, we reexamine models 1 , 2  and 3 for the situation where all possible content of 
interest to the relevant community is already available on one or the other of the Web sites. 
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Mode1 1': Exclusive Content, Market Exhausted 
As in model 1, we assume that all content is exclusive to one or the other of the sites and that, 
therefore, no duplication (common content) is possible. In the simplest case, where a I 1 and the 
cost function is convex, we showed earlier that a unique equilibrium exists - if content is not 
exhausted. When content is exhausted, the largest player can add content up to the point where 
marginal cost equals marginal revenue. To find this point, we modify (5) to reflect that the 
content is exhausted so that player i's problem becomes 
where X represents the totality of content of interest to the community. Taking the derivative of 
(21) player i 's maximum potential content is at the point where either x,=X or 
Let f ,  solve (22). Now, any solution x, + x ,  = X that satisfies x, E [X - f ,  , f ,  ) and 
x ,  t [X - f ,  , f ,  ] is a potential equilibrium. For the non-convex version of model 1, a similar 
argument applies. Consequently, the equilibrium is path dependent and each player will race the 
other to capture content (as long as marginal revenue exceeds the marginal cost of the new 
content) until all that can be added has been added. 
Models 2' and 3': Non-exclusive Content, Market Exhausted 
From the previous analysis of models 2 and 3 with concave costs, when it is possible to add new 
information, either duplication does not occur or the larger player duplicates everything owned by 
the smaller player. In this section, we cover the situation where it is not possible to add new 
information. We take the initial positions in content as given and examine what happens when 
the players compete by duplicating the content of the other sites. 
Model 2' 
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Let X represent the totality of content of interest to the community and assume that all the 
relevant content is covered by the Web sites. Given the initial captures of unique content of x,, 
and x,,, optimization model 2 (equation ( I  1)) becomes 
max (xi , ,  x, ) = d l  x L 
I ,  20 X - c* (xi, + x ,  
where xi, is fixed at X-xj,-x,. Now x, is constant when player i moves to change x, since any 
change in x, by i reduces xi, instead. 
The derivative of (23) with respect to x, is 
That is, if any content is duplicated by the larger player, it is duplicated until the marginal cost 
d 
reaches the constant 1 or until x, is exhausted. This implies the following result. 
2 X  
Theorem 6: Assume that both players have the same marginal revenue, d , and the same cost 
function and that this cost function is convex. In model 2' if the players duplicate any 
information, then both players have equal shares even if one player can get an initial advantage 
before the content is completely covered. Furthermore, the equilibrium is unique. 
Proof: Let x,,>O. If x ,  = X , the result follows immediately. Otherwise, from (24), at an optimum 
point for each player, , we have 
d 
c ' (x iu  + x , )  = c X ( x j u  + X,$) = - 
2 X  
If (22) holds and x, < X , then 
This implies 
Given this, it is clear that the solution is unique, which completes the proof. 
From (24) we can also conclude the following. 
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Theorem 7: In model 2', if C, (x) is concave and all content relevant to the community is 
covered, then either all or no content is shared. 
Proof: If C, (x) is concave, (23) is convex. Since the maximum of a convex function lies at an 
extreme point, the result holds. 
Model 3' 
We now examine model 3 (equation (17)) for the case when all available content has been 
exhausted. The results follow the same pattern as in model 3. The optimization problem for 
player i is as follows 
rnax (x, ,x,$ ) = d, x X i  - x,s - c; ( x ~  +X,J . 
x, t o  X - 2x, 
Taking the derivative with respect to x,~, we get 
When player i has less than half of the market, (29) is necessarily negative. This means that 
player i never wants to acquire shared information. When player i has half of the market or more, 
the revenue tenn is convex and we can say the following. 
Theorem 8: In model 3', if C, (x) is concave, then the dominant player duplicates either all of 
the content of the other player or duplicates none of the other player's information. 
Proof: Again, the maximum of a convex function lies at one of its extreme points and (29) is 
convex in this case. 
We can also say: 
Corollary: If the cost functions are identical and any content is duplicated, either both players 
duplicate everything or the larger player eliminates the smaller player by completely duplicating 
its content. 
If C, (x) is convex instead of concave, then it is difficult to characterize the equilibrium. 
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7. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
Table 2 summarizes the major qualitative results from this analysis across all models. Note that 
we assume away differences between the firms in terms of marketing and Web site design. 
Furthermore, some of the results assume that the two firms have identical cost functions. Under 
these circumstances, only the value of the content on each site as perceived by users comes into 
play in the analysis. 
The duopoly games analyzed in the previous sections have different solutions. In some cases, e.g. 
the convex version of model 1 and certain cases of models 2 and 3, a unique equilibrium point is 
assured. In other cases, the result of the game is uncertain. 
Our analysis sheds light on two sets of questions. The first set of questions has to do with the 
strategies of the various players and the second set with the likely end state in the market. We 
discuss each in turn. 
In model 1, when both players have exclusive information, the nature of the competition depends 
on the parameter a and whether or not the relevant content space can be exhausted. When a 5 1, 
a functioning market with multiple competitors evolves. When a > 1, the players engage in a 
race for content and a natural monopoly can result. Nothing certain can be said about the 
outcome. This situation is indicated in Figure 4(a). 
When content is not exclusive to either site (i.e., the same content may be displayed on both sites) 
the optimal strategies depend on the assumptions about user behavior. 
Model 2 assumes that consumers visit sites randomly depending on their content needs at the 
time. In model 2 each player optimizes by differentiating itself through adding unique content up 
to the point where marginal revenue equals marginal cost, as long as new content is available. 
Once all the available content has been exhausted, the only avenue for growth for a player is to 
duplicate on its own site the content of the other player. In this case, with concave costs, either no 
content is duplicated or all of the content is duplicated. If no content is duplicated, the players 
end up with a share of the market based on their starting positions plus the unique content they 
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Table 2: Summary of Major Results 1 Content 1 a 1 Demand Cost 1 Interaction Between 
Model Assumption Assumption Function Players 
I 
Thms 























Equally likely to 
visit either site 
for shared info. 
Player 1 may initially 
irzcrense content in 
response to an 
increase by player 2. 
Uncertain. Both players 
race for market share. 
Winner can take all. 
Equilibrium 
Unique equilibrium with 
multiple participants. 
Not necessarily have an 






First mover advantage. 
( Same as above) 
investment possible. 
(Same as above) 
(Same as 1). Continuum 
of multiple equilibria. 
First mover advantage. 
Neither website will 
duplicate content of the 
other as long as new 
material can be added. 
First mover advantage. 
(Same as above) 
1 First mover advantage. 1 shared. 
Convex [ If any content is I Unique equilibrium 
(Same as above) 
Can have a monopoly. 
Unique equilibrium with 
both players positive 
Concave 
Concave 
/ duplicated, both players 
Either all or no 
content is shared. 
/ will end up with equal 
Two possibilities, either 
all or no content is 
shares. 
Smaller website never 
duplicates content of 
larger. Larger may 
duplicate all of smaller. 
Two equilibria; either 
largest player eliminates 
smaller player or no 
content is duplicated. 
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~ i k t  mover advantage. 
Smaller website never 
duplicates content of 
larger . Larger may 
duplicate some or all of 
smaller. First mover 
advantage. 
(Same as 3) 
(Same as 3) 
Multiple possibilities for 
equilibria 
Two equilibria; either 
largest player eliminates 
smaller player or no 
content is duplicated. 
Indeterminant 
obtain through new acquisitions. If all of the content is duplicated then, by definition, both 
players end up with equal shares of the market. The possible paths are indicated in Figure 4(b). 
Model 3 assumes that consumers are attracted to a site based on its share of unique content. In 
this case, it never pays for the smaller Web site to duplicate content displayed on the larger site. 
However, it should continue to add its own unique content while it is available and while the 
marginal revenue of the unique content exceeds its marginal cost. If it does this quickly enough, it 
may end up becoming the larger player. The larger player may find it optimal to not duplicate any 
content from the smaller site. In this case, both sites will co-exist with whatever share of the 
market they are able to obtain with unique information. If it is optimal for the larger firm to 
duplicate content available on the smaller firm's site, then, with concave costs, it is optimal to 
duplicate all of the content and the smaller firm will be forced out of business. These results are 
summarized in Figure 4(c). 
The above three models are driven by different assumptions about customer demand. It is 
therefore interesting to consider their implications for marketing strategies designed to shape 
customer opinions regarding content and community Web sites. In general, the advertising of 
large firms should emphasize their unique content and community features, since large firms have 
more to gain from a market characterized by model 3. On the other hand, smaller firms should 
emphasize the total size of their content and community offerings, since market model 2, offers 
more chance for survival for the smaller firm.Vv'e now turn to the second set of questions - those 
concerning the equilibrium state in the information game. The most important question is whether 
or not one firm can capture a market niche. From the above analysis, it is obvious that the larger 
Web site has a competitive advantage ceteris paribus. However, this does not always mean that 
the smaller Web site will be eliminated. Based on the market-demand assumptions, and arguing 
purely from the point of view of the attractiveness of the content to consumers, we have 
demonstrated a number of cases of competitive equilibria in which two firms coexist with 
positive market shares. If the smaller firm is in one of these situations, and especially if it 
employs good marketing techniques and efficient operations, it should be able to survive in the 
long term. In the cases where a player can completely capture a niche, typically, non-convexities 
create scale economies. If the content of an area can be exhausted, being first, and becoming the 
largest player is enough to lead to market control, as in model 3'. 
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As pointed out in Section 2 of the paper, x,, the amount of content, is a proxy measure for the 
attractiveness of the site, which in many cases grows with the number of users of the site (through 
their additions to chat rooms, news groups, etc.). Positive returns in the cost of providing content 
can enter through the presence of a concave cost function as also discussed in Section 2. The 
economies of scale from operating in more than one community are not included in our models. 
When these economies occur, larger firms have an even greater advantage than indicated by our 
analysis. 
8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The different information games presented here provide some insights into the nature of the 
competition for "mindshare" among information and community sites. At present, we believe that 
the explosion of activity on the Internet best matches the class of games without duplicate content 
that we analyzed under Model 1. While many competing sites look very similar, most of the 
action appears to be in developing whole new areas of content. For example, sites such as 
how2.com and justwheels.com have identified unique and very plausible content areas. 
In the near future, sites will expend more effort to duplicate the material on other sites and the 
second set of games (Models 2 and 3) will become more relevant as various market segments 
begin to consolidate. 
In this paper, we have analyzed only a few of the many possible information games. For 
example, instead of assuming a homogeneous set of content items, we could define classes of 
content with a separate cost equation for acquiring content in each class. If we interpret x, as the 
utility of the content (rather than as a measure of the quantity of information), having different 
cost equations can be regarded as having different values for different kinds of information. The 
above theorems would hold for each individual class of information. Then, in models 2 and 3, 
duplication could occur before the entire universe of relevant content is covered. Nevertheless, 
duplication within a class would not occur until the Web sites fully cover that class of 
information. 
We have focused on equilibrium solutions and have not addressed the dynamics of the games. 
For example, our cost function does not differentiate between acquisition and maintenance of 
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information. In understanding the evolution of the play in the game we need to see how the 
market evolves with content treated as either stocks or flows. If content is a stock, then it is 
cheap to maintain and path dependence is important. If it is a flow, it is expensive to maintain the 
flow of information. With content a flow, if a player duplicates another's information, then the 
smaller player may have to abandon the flow and the attacking player acquires a unique stream. 
If maintaining content is far cheaper than acquiring information, then once the content space for 
the community is exhausted, the larger site has a harder time dislodging the smaller site, since the 
smaller site pays the lower maintenance costs. 
Another game is to determine if subscriptions should be charged for access to either specific 
classes of "premium" material within the site or to all material on the site. If it is optimal to 
charge a subscription price, the next issue is to determine its value. This brings in the traditional 
elements of oligopoly theory. As illustrated by the encyclopaedia example, an important aspect 
of this problem is the psychological discontinuity between allowing free access versus charging 
anything, no matter how small. 
In all of these games we have presumed that the material can be acquired at cost. However, much 
of the content is provided by third parties. For example, Reuters is a major provider of financial 
information to Yahoo. This leads to situations where suppliers can play off Web sites against 
each other. Suppliers have to consider the costs and benefits of offering exclusives on the content 
they develop. To some extent, suppliers can play a monopoly game. Yet, they have to make sure 
that by favoring a supplier they do not create a dominant Web site and face a monopsony game. 
Much of the run up in Internet stocks has come from people looking for the next Microsoft and 
Intel. Our analysis shows the potential for monopoly power. However, we do not see the 
potential for natural monopoly power over a correspondingly large a segment of the Internet 
market, or total mindshare, as these two companies have over the key valued-added segments of 
the personal computer market. Currently, Web communities are fragmented and there are few 
barriers to new communities forming. We have not investigated the possibilities of communities 
linking across providers or abandoning one provider for another. Furthermore, we have not 
looked into the value of acquiring one's competitors or companies that operate in adjacent 
communities. 
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Clearly, as the market becomes more complex, the positioning strategies of the various players 
become more elaborate and more features of the market must be considered. 
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Figure 1 
Reaction Functions & Equilibrium for Convex Version of Game 1 
Figure 2 
Player 1 Profit for Fixed Levels of Player 2 Content 
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Model 2 - Non-Exclusive Content 
Initial growth by adding 
new content only 
Shared Content 
Initial growth by adding 
new content only 
Final market shares not necessarily equal - unless 
cost functions are the same 
Model 2' - Non-Exclusive Content, Market Exhausted 
Total content exheusted ---+ Initial growth by adding new content only. When the total 
at this point content is exhausted, content is duplicated from the other's site 
until marginal cost = D12X. 
Shared Content Total content = X (fixed) 
Figure 3(b) 
Final market shares are equal - if cost functions are Duopoly Competing on Non-Exclusive Content 
the same Case of Independent Visits 
Model 3 - Non-Exclusive Content 
Smaller player never tries to duplicate infortnation of larger player 
If 2x2 < x,, the smaller player (2) collapses 
If 2x2 > x,, there are 2 potential equilibria as illustrated. 
Equilibrium 2 
,-_ Larger player 
does not 
Shared Content Shared Content duplicate any of 
content smaller player's 
content 
Slnaller player collapses Smaller player survives 
Model 3' - Non-Exclusive Content, Market Exhausted 
The results mirror those for the case when all the content 
is not exhausted. 
If C(x) is concave, either the dominant player duplicates 
all of the content of the smaller player and the smaller 
player collapses or it duplicates no content - in which 
case the smaller player survives. 
If C(x) is convex, the results are indeterminant. 
Figure 4(cf 
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